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 
Abstract— This research paper builds on existing knowledge in 
the field of parametric Linear Programming (pLP) and 
proposes a continuous mathematical model that considers a 
multi-period Quantity Flexibility (QF) contract between a car 
manufacturer (buyer) and external parts supplying company. 
The supplier periodically delivers parts to the car manufacturer 
as agreed in the contract. Due to the uncertainty of the demand 
for parts, the car manufacturer -in concert with the supplier- 
aims to develop a policy –at strategic level, that determines the 
optimal nominal order quantity (𝑸) and variation rate (𝜷) 
underpinning the contract that ensures the actual order 
quantity satisfies the actual demand and the total cost is 
minimised over the contract length. The behaviour of the 
mathematical model has been examined in order to establish its 
feasibility and convexity, consequently guaranteeing an optimal 
solution. Simulations have been carried out to evaluate the 
relationship of the total cost with respect to the variation rate 
and the nominal quantity ordered. 
 
Keywords: multi-period, quantity flexibility, parametric linear 
programming, contracting 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Supply chain (SC) coordination through contracts has been 
widely studied in literature and extensively used in 
industries. Detailed reviews of SC coordination through 
contracts are given in the works of [(Cachon, 2003); (Whang, 
1995); (Lariviere, 1999); (Tsay et al., 1999b)]. Although the 
three types of flows -material, information and financial are 
well known, Hohn (2010) argues that classifying Supply 
chain contracts is not straightforward.  
 
In this paper, the literature review’s focus is placed on 
contract flexibility –frequently used in capacity reservation 
for transportation and also similar works are found in high 
tech industries, such as automotive parts and semiconductor 
(Knoblich et al., 2011). These industries are brought to 
carefully consider the way their businesses are conducted due 
to their rapidly changing technological realm, capital 
intensive investment approach and high demand uncertainty 
[(Knoblich et al., 2011), (Park and Kim, 2013)]. To 
overcome these hurdles, flexible supply coordination through 
contracts between the partners is commonly used.  
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According to Das and Abdel-Malek (2003), SC flexibility is 
the robustness of the buyer-supplier relationship under 
changing supply conditions.  
 
There has been growing body of research related to the 
literature of QF. These are split into two major taxonomic 
groups (Park and Kim, 2013). The first consist of: general 
contracts -commonly found in manufacturing and retail 
industries, addressing contractual clauses including pricing, 
Buy-Back or Return Policies, Quantity Flexibility (QF), 
Minimum Commitment (MC), Allocation Rules (AR) and 
Lead time. Under this group of clauses, the flexibility allows 
some deviation in the buyer ultimate procurement. The 
second encompasses specialised contracts, commonly 
employed in capital intensive industries (Park and Kim, 
2013). 
 
Sethi et al (2004) carried out work on both single and multi-
period versions of quantity flexibility contracts that 
considered a single demand forecast update per period and a 
spot market. Sethi et al (2004) modelled the problem as a one 
period, two stage quantity flexibility contracts between a 
buyer and a supplier and then as a multi-period stochastic 
dynamic programing problem utilising stochastic comparison 
theory to investigate the effect on the optimal policy and the 
expected profit of the quality of forecast updates. Their work 
culminated to methods that allowed obtaining an optimal 
order quantity from a contracted supplier and a spot market. 
Kim (2011) studied the effects of QF contract on the 
performance of a two-echelon supply chain under dynamic 
market demands. Kim (2011) analysed the flexibility profile 
of the QF contract stemming from a discrete-event 
simulation approach that was aimed at comparing the 
impacts of the given order policy on performance outcome 
with and without the QF contract.   
 
Contrary to previous similar works where the optimal 
nominal quantity and flexibility parameters were predicted 
using solely deterministic and probabilistic models, this 
current work considers a deterministic setting of forecast or 
historical requirement for a “one year finite horizon” and 
extend the projection accounting for the case where the data 
in the objective could be continuous by fitting a pLP model. 
Hence forth we propose, in this work, a finite horizon pLP 
model that considers a quantity flexibility contract between 
two independent players. A car manufacturer, a Stackelberg 
leader and a parts supplying company working together in 
order to minimise –at the strategic level, the standard 
deviation between ultimate parts procurement and the 
nominal order quantity (Q) initially placed by the car 
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manufacturer. This feat is accomplished by minimising the 
order flexibility -which translates in practice to the 
minimisation of the variation rate (𝜷).  A natural constraint 
of this exercise is that the optimal order quantity in each 
period in the planning horizon is restricted within the 
minimum and maximum order quantity level. The 
collaboration between the two players will amount to 
incentives on both parties in the form of reduced uncertainty 
and optimum ordering cost for the supplier and the car 
manufacturer respectively. 
II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The model considered in the current work is an example of a 
two-echelon SC, in which a QF contract is agreed between 
two main players, a buyer and supplier.  The buyer is 
provided with some flexibility with respect to the nominal 
ordering quantity 𝑄 but, is duty bound to commit to 
minimum purchase quantity, 𝐿 (𝛽), below the initial order. 
The supplier in return, agrees to meet the actual order 
quantity (or firm order) provided that it falls below the 
maximum allowable purchase quantity, 𝑈(𝛽) above the 
nominal quantity. The supplier charges a unit purchasing cost 
 𝑝(𝛽) to contain risks. When signing the contract with the 
supplier, 𝛽 and 𝑄 need to be decided to minimise the total 
cost. This problem is a big challenge to the buyer due to the 
high variation of the actual demand. 
A. Notations 
The following notations will be used throughout this paper.  
i. Input Data 
𝑇          Number of periods in the contracts, thus period, 
t = 1,2, …, T, represents different periods within 
the planning horizon  
𝑑𝑡 Demand at time t (unknown in reality. In this 
paper, demand is forecasted using historical 
data.)  
ℎ Unit inventory holding cost per period 
𝑠 Unit shortage cost per period  
 
ii. Decision Variables  
𝑥𝑡 Order quantity of period t,  𝑥 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑇)        
𝛽 Variation rate with respect to the nominal 
quantity (𝑄) 
𝑄 Nominal order quantity 
𝑝(𝛽) Unit purchasing cost in function of the 
variation rate. Assumption is made in this 
current work that 𝑝(𝛽) is a linear or piecewise 
linear convex function  
𝑈(𝛽) Upper bound on ordered quantity per period, 
where 𝑈(𝛽) = 𝑄(1 + 𝛽) ≥ 𝑥𝑡 
𝐿(𝛽) Lower bound on the ordered quantity per 
period, where 𝐿(𝛽) = 𝑄(1 − 𝛽) ≤ 𝑥𝑡 
𝑣ℎ𝑠 Total holding /shortage cost 
𝐾𝑡 Purchasing cost at period t  
𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄, 𝑥) Total cost over the length of the contract 
B. Cost Analysis 
In each period of the contract, three costs will be incurred - 
Purchasing cost, inventory cost and holding cost. The total 
cost is thus defined as the sum of these three costs. With 
different order quantities in each period, the cost will be 
different.  
The purpose of the analysis is to determine the optimal 
values of 𝜷 and 𝑸 that minimises the deviation between the 
initial and ultimate procurement, consequently minimising 
the total cost of purchase, inventory holding and shortage 
costs.  
Assumptions are made that:  
 All current or back ordered demands need to be 
satisfied at the end of the contract meaning that no 
ordering cost is incurred. 
 The unit purchase cost 𝑝(𝛽) is assumed to be linear 
or piecewise linear convex function and is given by 
the expression:  𝑝(𝛽) = 𝑐0 + 𝛽. 𝑐1      (1) 
Where 𝑐0, represents the minimal possible cost with 
zero flexibility and 𝑐1 is a given fixed rate of 
change of 𝑝(𝛽). 
C. Construction of the cost function  
If 𝑑1, … , 𝑑𝑇 are the demands for the next T periods and 
backorder is allowed, two cases arise:  
 
1. Holding/shortage cost for period t (𝑣𝑡) 
ℎ ∙ ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑑𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1  If ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑑𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1 ≥ 0                                         (1) 
𝑠 ∑ (𝑑𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1  If  ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑑𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1 ≤ 0                                           (2) 
 
This leads to the following 
 
𝑣𝑡 = max [ℎ ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑑𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1 , 𝑠 ∑ (𝑑𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1 ]                                (3) 
 
2.  Purchasing Cost for period t (𝐾𝑡) 
𝐾𝑡 =  𝑝(𝛽) ∙ 𝑥𝑡                                                                               (4) 
 
3. The total cost can then be written as: 
 𝑓(𝛽, 𝑄, 𝒙) =  ∑ (𝑣𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1                                                          (5) 
D. Problem formulation  
In this paper, we consider that backorder is allowed. 
The optimisation problem can be formulated as:  
 
Minimize:  𝑓(𝛽, 𝑄, 𝒙)                                                                     (6) 
s.t: 
𝑥𝑡  ≥ 𝑄(1 − 𝛽),            𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇                                             (7) 
−𝑥𝑡  ≥ −𝑄(1 + 𝛽),      𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇                                            (8) 
1 ≥ 𝛽 ≥ 0 
𝑄 ≥ 0 
 
Given the vector of order quantity, 
 𝒙∗(𝛽, 𝑄) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑓(𝛽, 𝑄, 𝒙)| 
                     𝑄(1 − 𝛽) ≤ 𝑥𝑡 ≤ 𝑄(1 + 𝛽), 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇}, 
and 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) = 𝑓(𝛽, 𝑄, 𝒙∗(𝛽, 𝑄)).  
  
 
Our problem is to find the values of 𝛽 and 𝑄 minimizing 
𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) such that 1 ≥ 𝛽 ≥ 0 and 𝑄 ≥ 0 . 
 
III. LINEARIZATION OF THE MODEL 
The objective function (6) in Section II is nonlinear. To 
linearize the objective function, we introduce the additional 
decision variable and addition constraints as follows: 
 
 𝐽𝑡   : The inventory holding/shortage cost of 
period 𝑡, 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇   
 𝐽𝑡 − ℎ ∑ 𝑥𝑖  
𝑡
𝑖=1 ≥  −ℎ ∙ 𝐷𝑡 ,   𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇         (9) 
 𝐽𝑡 +  𝑠 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1  ≥  𝑠 ∙ 𝐷𝑡        𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇        (10) 
Where 𝐷𝑡 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1  represents the cumulative demand 
from initial to current period.  
 Assumption is made, without being restrictive, that  
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 = ∑ 𝑑𝑡 = 𝐷𝑇 
𝑇
𝑡=1  , making ∑ 𝐾𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 =
  ∑ 𝑝(𝛽)  ∙ 𝑥𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 = 𝑝(𝛽) ∙ 𝐷𝑇 independent of 𝑥𝑡 and 
hence can be dropped from (6) when computing 
 𝑥∗(𝛽, 𝑄) and from the optimisation process. 
 Define  𝑦𝑡 =  𝑥𝑡 − 𝑄(1 − 𝛽),   𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇     (11) 
Applying the above substitutions and assumptions to the 
initial mathematical model (6) – (8), we have the Primal pLP 
expressed by: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒  ∑ 𝐽𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1                                                                         (12) 
s.t: 
 𝐽𝑡 − ℎ ∑ 𝑦𝑖  
𝑡
𝑖=1 ≥ ℎ[− 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑡𝑄(1 − 𝛽)]                             (13)                                                           
  𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇                                           
    𝐽𝑡 + 𝑠 ∑ 𝑦𝑖  
𝑡
𝑖=1 ≥  𝑠[𝐷𝑡 − 𝑡𝑄(1 − 𝛽)] ,                         (14)                    
  𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇                  
 −𝑦𝑡 ≥ −2𝑄𝛽                                                                         (15) 
𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇  
 ∑ 𝑦𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 =  𝐷𝑇 − 𝑇𝑄(1 − 𝛽)                                                 (16) 
 𝑦𝑡 ≥ 0                          
𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇                                  
By introducing  𝜺 , ŋ, 𝜽 and 𝐪 as the multipliers of the 
constraints (13) – (16) respectively, and letting:  
∆𝑡= 𝐷𝑡 − 𝑡𝑄(1 − 𝛽)                                                                           (17)                                                     
 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇        
The dual pLP of the primal pLP can be written as follows:      
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∆𝑇𝑞 + ∑ [−ℎ ∙ ∆𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑠 ∙ ∆𝑡ŋ𝑡 − 2𝑄𝛽. 𝜃𝑡]                    (18)  
𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
S.t:  
−ℎ ∑ 𝜀𝑖 + 𝑠 ∑ ŋ𝑖 −
𝑇
𝑖=𝑡
𝑇
𝑖=𝑡
𝜃𝑡 + 𝑞 ≤ 0                                                   (19) 
𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇    
       𝜀𝑡 + ŋ𝑡 = 1                                                                                     (20) 
  𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇 
       𝜀𝑡, ŋ𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡 ≥ 0                                                                                   (21) 
Let 𝑣(𝛽, 𝑄) be the optimal value of the objective function of 
this (primal or dual) LP, then: 
 
𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) = 𝑝(𝛽)𝐷𝑇 + 𝑣(𝛽, 𝑄)                                                     (22) 
 
Note that the first term, which is independent of x, has been 
dropped from the LP, and must be reintroduced when 
computing 𝑔.  
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
Notice that the primal pLP is a Right-hand-side pLP (RHS-
pLP) of parameters 𝛽 and  𝑄 and its dual is an “objective 
function pLP” (OF-pLP). The examination of the behaviour 
of the objective function is thus less complex using the dual 
pLP. Since the examination of the joint convexity property of 
𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄)  with respect to both 𝛽 and 𝑄 is complicated. We 
leave this proof for our research work.  
 
In this paper, we are to examine the joint convexity property 
of 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) by some simulation work.  To validate our 
simulation process, we provide the proof of the convexity of 
𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) by fixing either 𝛽 or 𝑄 first.  
 
Theorem 1: Given a fixed value of Q,  𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄)  is a convex 
function with respect to parameter 𝛽.  
 
Proof:  Since from (22), we know that  𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) = 𝑝(𝛽)𝐷𝑇 +
𝑣(𝛽, 𝑄) and 𝑝(𝛽)𝐷𝑇   are a convex function with respect to 𝛽 
obviously, we just need to prove that 𝑣(𝛽, 𝑄) is a convex 
function with respect to 𝛽. Since Q is fixed we use 𝑣(𝛽) to 
replace 𝑣(𝛽, 𝑄) in the following discussion. 
 
Let 𝜺 , ŋ and  𝜽 be T-vectors such that:  
𝜺 = (𝜀1, … , 𝜀𝑇)
𝑻  ,  ŋ = (ŋ1, … , ŋ𝑇)
𝑻,    𝜽 = (𝜃1  … , 𝜃𝑇)
𝑻 and 
𝒒 = (𝑞, … , 𝑞)𝑻 a unit vector,  the solution vector of the dual 
PLP can be written as 𝒔 = (𝒒, 𝜺, ŋ, 𝜽) 
 
The objective function 𝑣(𝛽)  can be written as (𝛽) = 𝑼(𝛽) ∙
𝒔 , where 𝑼(𝛽) = [(𝒄 + 𝜸𝛽)] is the coefficient vector.  
We can assume without loss of generality that the dual pLP 
problem can be expressed as:  
𝑣(𝛽) = 𝑚𝑎 𝑥{𝑼(𝛽). 𝑺 | 𝑨. 𝑺 ≤ 𝒀, 𝑺 ≥ 0, 𝑨 ∈ 𝑅𝑚×𝑛, 𝛽 ∈
[0,1]}                                                                                      (26)      
                                                                                                                    
With A being the matrix of the coefficients of the constraints, 
Y, being the set of vectors containing the right hand side of 
the constraints, and S, the set of vectors containing the 
decision vectors of the standard pLP problem.  
 
The feasibility of 𝑣(𝛽) is clearly independent of the objective 
function, hence forth, only the case when the problem is 
feasible is addressed.  
 Let 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, be the range of values of β for which a 
finite maximum exists for 𝑣(𝛽) 
 Let 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, be any two points in the interval [0, 1] 
such that 𝒔𝟏
∗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝒔𝟐
∗  are the corresponding optimal 
solutions to the dual LP with objective functions 𝑣(𝛽1) 
and 𝑣(𝛽2).  
  
 
 ∀ 𝜶 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏], we define 𝛽3 = 𝛼. 𝛽1 + (1 − 𝛼). 𝛽2 and 
let the optimal solution for 𝑣(𝛽3) be 𝒔𝟑  
∗ and 𝑣∗(𝛽3) be 
its optimal objective value 
 
 𝑣∗(𝛽3) = 𝑈(𝛽3). 𝒔𝟑  
∗                                                           (27) 
            = (𝒄 + 𝜸𝛽3). 𝒔𝟑  
∗  
            = [𝒄 + (𝛼. 𝛽1 + (1 − 𝛼). 𝛽2). 𝜸]. 𝒔𝟑  
∗  
            = α. (𝒄 + 𝛽1. 𝜸). 𝒔𝟑  
∗ + (1 − 𝛼). (𝒄 + 𝛽2. 𝜸). 𝒔𝟑  
∗   
            ≤  𝛼. 𝑣∗(𝛽1) + (1 − 𝛼). 𝑣
∗(𝛽2)  
                                                            
The above inequality holds since: 
 
 𝒔𝟑
∗  is feasible solution to the Dual pLP with objective 
functions 𝑣(𝛽1) and 𝑣(𝛽2). 
 
Thus given a fixed value of 𝑄,  𝑣(𝛽, 𝑄)  is a convex 
function with respect to parameter 𝛽. And in general, the 
theorem 1 holds.  
Corollary 1: Given a fixed value of 𝛽,  𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄)  is a convex 
function with respect to parameter 𝑄. 
V. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS  
We are to explore the convexity of 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) with respect to 
𝛽  and 𝑄 using simulation. For each combination of 𝛽 
and 𝑄, the dual PLP model was solved with the Solver 
embedded in Microsoft Excel 2007, which gives 
us 𝑣∗(𝛽, 𝑄).  The feasible range of 𝛽  and 𝑄  derived from 
equation (7) and (8) are given in Table 1.  
TABLE I.   FEASIBLE RANGE OF 𝛽  AND 𝑄 
Variation rate (𝛽) Nominal quantity (𝑄) 
[0, 1] 
[
𝐷𝑇
𝑇(1 + 𝛽)
,
𝐷𝑇
𝑇(1 − 𝛽)
] 
 
To make the flexibility analysis of the contract, it is 
necessary to provide the feasible range of  𝛽  and 𝑄 in 
another way round, where the range of  𝛽  is the function of 
𝑄. That is, for a fixed value 𝑄, all possible 𝛽 values needs to 
be explore to find the best one to provide the lowest total 
cost. From Table 1, it is easily deduced that the range of 𝛽 is 
[max (1 −
𝐷𝑇
𝑄∙𝑇
,
𝐷𝑇
𝑄∙𝑇
− 1), 1]. 
A. Input Data 
The input data to the dual PLP model is given in Table 2 and 
Table 3, where 𝑇 = 12  months in a year. Each period is one 
month.  
Table 2 below, represents a one year historical demand 
(forecast) and the accumulation of the demands for each 
period. Table 3 shows that the demand is not stationary over 
the planning horizon.  
TABLE II.  DEMAND IN A YEAR 
𝒕 (month) 𝒅𝒕 (units) 𝑫𝒕 (units) 
1 100 100 
2 100 200 
3 100 300 
4 90 390 
5 110 500 
6 120 620 
7 80 700 
8 70 770 
9 130 900 
10 80 980 
11 120 1100 
12 100 1200 
 
Where 𝑫𝒕 is the accumulated demand.  
The holding and shortage costs are stationary through the 
planning horizon, i.e., ℎ𝑡 = ℎ, 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠. The minimum possible 
cost, 𝑐0 and 𝑐1 are fixed. According to the assumption   
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 = ∑ 𝑑𝑡 = 𝐷𝑇  
𝑇
𝑡=1 , we have the total 
demand, 𝐷𝑇 =1200.   
TABLE III.  INPUT DATA 
𝒉 (£) 𝒔(£) 𝒄𝟎(£) 𝑫𝑻 (units) 𝒄𝟏(£) 
2 10 10 1200 0.5 
 
B. Optimisation of the pLP model   
Since computing all the combinations of 𝛽 and 𝑄 is 
exhaustive, and bearing in mind that the convexity of the 
dual pLP with respect to 𝛽 when 𝑄 is fixed and the 
convexity of the dual pLP with respect to 𝑄 when  𝛽 is fixed 
were theoretically verified (Theorem 1). Decision was made 
to conduct the optimisation using Equal Interval Search 
(EIS) Method- which helped narrow the sampling space. 
 EIS Method is one of the techniques used for finding the 
extreme value (minimum or maximum of a strictly unimodal 
function by successively narrowing the range of values inside 
which the extreme value is known to exist.  
The basic idea of this EIS Method to explore all possible 
solutions of 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) is to explore all the possible value of  𝑄 
by starting with𝑄 = 0, then increase the value of 𝑄  by 1 
each time. With a give value 𝑄, we don’t need to explore all 
the values of 𝛽 in [max (1 −
𝐷𝑇
𝑄∙𝑇
,
𝐷𝑇
𝑄∙𝑇
− 1), 1].    
Due to the fact that the convexity of the dual pLP with fixed 
value 𝛽  was theoretically verified, we can apply EIS Method 
  
 
to explore limited number of value 𝑄 without loss of 
optimality.  
To help simulate the behaviour of  𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) , a macro –set of 
VBA codes was written and imbedded in Excel to implement 
EIS Method.  
C. Optimisation results  
 
Table 4 gives part of the simulation results, where 𝑄 is fixed 
to 100, which is the mean of the forecasted demand 𝒅𝒕 and 
the value of 𝛽 is explored using EIS method.  
TABLE IV.  SIMULATION RESULTS FOR 𝑄 = 100 
𝑸 𝜷 𝑽𝒉𝒔 𝑲𝒕 𝒈(𝜷, 𝑸) 
100 0.00 320 12,000 12,320 
100 0.50 0 12,300 12,300 
100 0.51 0 12,306 12,306 
100 1.00 0 12,600 12,600 
100 0.01 300 12,006 12,306 
100 0.25 10 12,150 12,160 
100 0.26 8 12,156 12,164 
100 0.49 0 12,294 12,294 
100 0.02 280 12,012 12,292 
100 0.13 98 12,078 12,176 
100 0.14 84 12,084 12,168 
100 0.24 12 12,144 12,156 
100 0.15 70 12,090 12,160 
100 0.19 30 12,114 12,144 
100 0.20 20 12,120 12,140 
100 0.23 14 12,138 12,152 
100 0.21 18 12,126 12,144 
100 0.22 16 12132 12148 
 
It is noted in Table 4 that the optimal total cost, 𝑔(𝛽, 100) =
12,140,  is achieved when 𝛽 = 0.20. 
Table 5 provides the simulation results for different 𝑄 values. 
For each fixed value 𝑄𝐹 , only the 𝛽 value, which can provide 
minimum 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄𝐹), is kept in one row of Table 5. Due to the 
size of the paper, we just provide the results of 𝑄 in the 
interval [90, 110]. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE V.  SIMULATION RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT 𝑄 VALUES. 
𝑸 𝛽 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) 𝑸 𝛽 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) 
91 0.26 12,208 102 0.22 12,150 
92 0.25 12,200 103 0.22 12,154 
93 0.24 12,192 104 0.23 12,159 
94 0.22 12,184 105 0.24 12,163 
95 0.21 12,176 106 0.25 12,167 
96 0.21 12,169 107 0.25 12,172 
97 0.19 12,161 108 0.26 12,176 
98 0.21 12,154 109 0.27 12,180 
99 0.20 12,147 110 0.27 12,184 
100 0.20 12,140 
   
 
The graph of the simulation work in Table 5 is shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship of total cost 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) and variable 𝑄 
 
It can be seen that 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) is a unimodal function with 
respect to both 𝛽. In the future, we aim to explore this feature 
theoretically. 
Table 6 below gives the best simulation result for the Data 
Input provided in section A. The optimum variation rate (𝛽), 
the optimum nominal quantity (𝑄), the total holding/shortage 
cost 𝒗 (𝛽, 𝑄) and total cost 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄) over the length of the 
contract are all listed.  
TABLE VI.  OPTIMUM RESULT FROM SIMULATION WORK 
𝒄𝟏 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜷
∗ 𝑸∗  𝒗∗(𝜷, 𝑸) 𝒈∗ (𝜷, 𝑸) 
Optimum 0.2 100 20 12140 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
A successful simulation of pLP problem was achieved in this 
work. The results shown in fig.1 clearly validate the 
conclusion that 𝑔(𝛽, 𝑄)  is convex with respect to 𝛽 and 𝑄 
the theoretical proof of joint convexity of both  
𝛽 and 𝑄 will be our future research. Also, the trade-off of 
ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑐0  and 𝑐1 with respect to the total cost will also be 
analysed in the future. 
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